Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.     

India: Fleeting Attachment to the Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy

India’s success in dealing with insurgency movements was based on adherence to four key rules of engagement: identifying a lead counter-insurgent force, launching population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, non-use of excessive force and confining the role of the COIN operations to preparing a ground for a political solution. While the country does not yet have a COIN doctrine, these four rules of engagement do constitute what can be referred to a COIN grand strategy. Analysis of the several continuing insurgencies, however, reveals the country’s inability to adhere to the grand strategy. Political considerations, incapacity to manoeuvre through the demands of various stake holders, and even the wish to expedite the decimation of insurgent outfits through a force-centric approach has produced a long history of failures in dousing the fires of discontent.     

(Re-)emergent orders: understanding the negotiation(s) of rebel governance

Abstract

The concept of order is often neglected in the study of conflict – seemingly such a ‘disordering’ process. With the recent increase in the examination of rebel governance however, bringing order back into our understanding of rebel and insurgent groups has much to offer in exploring the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Rebels both shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways. This article explores how varying elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of order and develops an original analytical framework to examine the perpetual negotiations of rebel movements in their attempts to cement their control.     

Bandit Queen: Cinematic representation of social banditry in India

Its long history and destabilising impact notwithstanding, banditry has received scant academic attention in India. Confined mostly to occasional and incident-driven media reportage, the socioeconomic factors that fuelled insurgencies and banditry and the milieu which provided a context for the operations of these outlawed movements received little attention. Cinematic representation of the social banditry phenomenon in the country, based on little or no first-hand research, as a result, suffered from ingenuousness and failed to emerge from the romanticised depiction of insurgency and terrorism which Bollywood, India's movie industry, is known for. Bandit Queen, the biopic of Phoolan Devi, in contrast, stands apart. Scathing criticisms regarding its use of sex as a tool for commercial success notwithstanding, the movie succeeds in drawing the viewers' attention to the persisting social cleavages in India. Using rape as its central theme, it shocks its audience into acknowledging the reality and relevance of social banditry in a country where governance remains an absent entity for a vast majority of its people. That most Bollywood movies depicting social issues have continued to remain aground in romanticism and irrelevance makes Bandit Queen even more relevant in times to come.     

Pakistan’s response to US foreign policy towards South Asia 1977–1993

Relations between the USA and Pakistan have been tenuous since the 1947 partition of British India and the subsequent creation of the former. The 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan focused the attention of the international community on South Asia. This article will examine the foreign policies of three successive US Presidential Administrations between 1977 and 1993, and how their decisions and corresponding actions were interpreted by the Pakistani government and its people. The key finding is the trend of the ebb and flow of US interest in Pakistan. The primary research conducted for this article shows that Pakistanis recognize this trend and consider it hypocritical of the US government. The current conditions in South Asia are ominously similar to those of 1992 with the drawdown of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan. Policy-makers would be wise to review the events of 1977–1993 so that the cycle is not repeated again.     

通用计算机实时仿真技术

通用计算机由于各种相互兼容的标准硬件及丰富的应用软件支持而获得了广泛的应用,但通用计算机往往运行多任务的操作系统,这种通用操作系统一般不能满足半实物仿真的实时性要求。讨论了通用计算机半实物仿真的实时时钟获取方法,重点研究了通用操作系统的帧时间不稳定问题。提出了保证实时仿真帧时间的几种方法,并建立了一个具体的通用仿真计算机系统。试验结果表明,基于通用计算机的实时仿真是可行的。     

当前编辑工作面临的新环境及应对之策

当前,随着时代的发展,编辑工作所处的社会环境、市场环境和技术环境发生了深刻变化,从而对编辑工作带来新的挑战。针对这一时代变化,分析了编辑工作面临的新环境,并提出了应对之策,以期对提高编辑工作质量有所裨益。     

Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar

Multiple ethnic insurgencies have existed in Myanmar since independence. The military junta's response has been extremely brutal at the tactical level, but has shown some political astuteness at the strategic level, with a series of ceasefires with most of the ethnic groups. Despite these ceasefires – most of which have resulted in the continued existence of quasi-independent armed groups – other ethnic movements have continued their armed operations. The overall strategic picture is one of stalemate, with the ethnic movements continuing to exist, but with few realistic prospects of expanding their operations.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.